Spatial Competition in Private Labels by Richards, Timothy J. et al.
 Richards is Power Professor and Patterson is Professor in the Morrison School of
1
Agribusiness, Arizona State University East, 7001 E. Williams Field Road, Bldg. 130, Mesa, AZ.
85212.  Hamilton is Professor in the Orfalea College of Business, Cal Poly University, San Luis
Obispo, CA. 93407. Contact author: Richards, phone: 480-727-1488 FAX: 480-727-1510 email:
trichards@asu.edu. Copyright 2006 Timothy J. Richards. All rights reserved. Do not cite or quote
without permission. 
Spatial Competition in Private Labels
by
Timothy J. Richards, Stephen F. Hamilton, and Paul M. Patterson
1
Paper presented at AAEA Annual Meeting
Portland, OR 
July 29 - August 1, 2007Spatial Competition in Private Labels
Abstract
    
Private labels, or store brands, are an important part of non-price competitive strategy among
multi-product retailers.  Previous research into the rationale for private label products focuses on
their ability to increase retailer’s power over suppliers in the vertical channel, or to facilitate
horizontal differentiation among retailers.  This paper seeks to identify the relative importance of
each role in retailers’ positioning of private labels.  This information is revealed through a novel
empirical approach that considers the relative positioning of national brands and private labels in
attribute space.  In selecting attributes for private labels, retailers face a trade off between
softening horizontal competition by differentiating their store brand from national brands, which
facilitates inter-retailer differentiation, or increasing bargaining power over national brand
manufacturers by designing products that closely mimic national brands.  A spatial nested logit
econometric model applied to the ice cream category shows that private labels tend to be
positioned near national brand products in attribute space, allowing retailers to gain a greater
share of the total marketing margin (manufacturer plus retailer margin).  Differentiating through
private labels allows a retailer to gain market share, but not necessarily increase retail margins.  
keywords: multiproduct oligopoly, nested logit, private labels, retailing, spatial modeling. 1
Spatial Competition in Private Labels
Introduction
Over the past several years, the use of store brands, or private labels, has become a key
component of retailer strategy.  In the U.S., consumers spent a record $108.0 billion on private
label products in 2005, an increase of 5.3% over 2004 (Datamonitor).  Private labels now account
for nearly one quarter of all consumer spending on food, beverages and personal care items. 
Both the trade press and academic research have documented several reasons for the popularity
of private labels – building store loyalty, targeting specific market segments, generating higher
margins, gaining strategic advantage over suppliers or maintaining control over the supply-chain. 
These reasons can be classified into two broad categories: (1) private labels that are similar to
national brands increase retailers’ bargaining power over manufacturers, thus raising retailers’
share of the total (manufacturing plus retailing) margin, and (2) private labels provide a means of
differentiating a retailer’s product line from that of its rivals, increasing the total margin on all
products sold.  This paper designs and implements an empirical test to examine the relative
importance of these two roles using a new approach that explicitly accounts for the strategic
positioning of private labels, both in price and in attributes. 
While offering important insights into the many potential explanations for the rise of
private label products, the research to date considers their value in retailers’ interaction with
others in the vertical channel – consumers downstream or upstream suppliers – and not as
strategic tools in horizontal rivalry with other stores.  However, retailers now regard horizontal
competition as perhaps their most pressing problem.  Therefore, private labels almost certainly
play an important role in store-differentiation, building market power, or in stealing others’ loyal
customers and building market share.  Indeed, in industry surveys retailers often cite the strategic
importance of private labels in competing with other stores (Food Institute).  What is not clear is2
whether the strategic impact is through the “market power effect” (store differentiation)
described above, or through the “market share effect” (attracting price sensitive consumers from
other stores) (Dhar and Hoch 1997).  Which effect dominates is an unresolved empirical
question.
In this paper, we use a spatial econometric approach to study the positioning of private
label products, specifically ice-cream.  The strategic position of a store brand is typically defined
in terms of its price point and revealed or “perceptual” substitutability with national brands
(Sayman, Hoch and Raju, 2002; Bontemps, Orozco, and Requillart, 2005; Choi and Coughlan,
2006).  However, because the degree of substitutability between any two pairs of products can
derive from a number of potential sources, we consider how retailers (and retailer-manufacturers)
position a product through the simultaneous choice of its attributes and its price.  Consequently, a
retailer’s decision to introduce a private label is inherently spatial.  
 Although developed in the context of private label products, our model also represents a
new way of thinking about the “demand for variety.”  Whereas Salop (1977), Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) and, more recently, Kim, Allenby and Rossi (2002), Watson (2004), and Draganska and
Jain (2005) define variety in terms of the number of products, or number of variants of a product,
variety is more appropriately defined in terms of the distance between products in characteristics
space.  Two examples help illustrate this concept.  In automobiles, if General Motors introduces
the Oldsmobile Alero, which is identical in nearly every respect but the nameplate to the Pontiac
Grand Am, is there necessarily greater variety in vehicle choice?  If Albertsons introduces a
flakes-and-berries cereal in response to the popularity of Kellogg’s “Red Berry Special K,” then
the number of stock-keeping-units (SKUs) offered by Albertsons increases by one, but does it
represent more variety?  Rather, our empirical description of variety refers to the span of
attributes within a give category, or the size of the space occupied by its products.  3
The objective of this paper is to empirically determine the strategic role played by private
label products among supermarket retailers.  We consider both a horizontal role, as retailers
compete for market share, and a vertical one, as retailers interact with imperfectly competitive
suppliers.  By taking both vertical and horizontal effects into account, we address a rationale for
the introduction and proliferation of private label products that has not been considered
previously in the empirical literature.  We also contribute to the spatial econometrics literature by
demonstrating how spatial dependence among substitute products can explain strategic choices
by retailers who, in this case, also serve as manufacturers, or product designers.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we develop an
econometric model of spatial competition among retailers offering private label products.  The
third section describes the data used to test this model and offers a detailed description of the
estimation methods.  The results are described in a fourth section, while the fifth provides some
conclusions, some implications for the study of interaction among retailers and suggestions for
future work in this area. 
Econometric Model of Spatial Competition in Private Label Products
Overview 
A retailer’s decision to introduce a private label, or store brand, casts it in a rather unique
position as a manufacturer and retailer both, competing with the suppliers that provide the
national brands often thought necessary to attract brand-loyal consumers.  Not surprisingly, the
complex role of private labels has given rise to a number of alternative explanations for why
retailers are increasingly choosing to compete with their own suppliers.   First, the positioning of
private labels has become an important tool in vertical competition with manufacturers (Sayman,4
Hoch and Raju 2002; Chintagunta, Bonfrer and Song, 2002; Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer 2004;
Choi and Coughlan, 2006).  Both theoretical and empirical research shows that private labels can
increase retailers’ bargaining power with national brand manufacturers.  Second, because private
labels are essentially a means for retailers to vertically integrate, store brands tend to have higher
margins that national brands because they reduce the double marginalization problem (Mills
1995, 1999; Bontemps, Monier and Requillart 1999; Sayman, Hoch and Raju, 2002).  Third,
store brands also allow retailers to maximize category revenue by discriminating between
different consumer types, charging lower private-label prices to value conscious consumers and
higher national-brand prices to brand loyal consumers in the same category (Gabrielsen, Steen
and Sorgard 2002; Bontemps et al 2005), although the empirical evidence is mixed in this regard
(Dhar and Hoch 1997; Ward, et al., 2002; Bonfrer and Chintagunta 2004).  Fourth, others argue
that retailers can increase their market power by differentiating themselves through high quality
private labels or by building a large brand loyal consumer segment (Ward et al. 2002).  The
econometric model, therefore, must be able to distinguish each of these potential motivations. 
On the demand side, we account for product differentiation in two ways.  First,
preferences are assumed to depend directly on the store, brand, flavor and whether a product is a
private label or national brand.  This assumption is uncontroversial as store and brand loyalty is
well documented while Mills (1995) and Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004) review the
relevant literature on consumer’s perceived bias against store brands.  Second, consumers are
assumed to  possess a subjective assessment of product quality that depends on the distance
between a product and all others in attribute space.  Shelf-prices, therefore, are adjusted by each
consumer’s judgement regarding quality (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980; Chiang, 1991; Nair,
Dube and Chintagunta, 2005).  Although others have incorporated distance in attribute space into
econometric models of differentiated-product demand (Pinkse, Slade and Brett, 2002; Pinkse and Pinkse and Slade (2004) apply the DM approach of Pinkse, Slade and Brett (2002), but because they
2
estimate demand directly, and not the best-reply function of Pinkse, Slade and Brett (2002), their estimating equation
does not involve a spatial autoregressive term per se.  Instead, the matrix of price responses consists of unspecified
functions of distances in attribute space.  Without a spatial autoregressive term, the estimation method is potentially
much simpler.  
 Our focus in this study is on competition among traditional supermarkets. Consequently, the outside
3
option consists of convenience stores, warehouse stores, dollar stores and other outlets. There are no Wal-Marts nor
other superstores in this market. 
5
Slade, 2004; Slade, 2004b), we are the first to do so in the context of competition among retailers
in a consumer-packaged good category.  This “distance metric” (DM) approach not only allows
us to differentiate between the demand for national brands and private labels, but also ensures
that the “independence of irrelevant alternative (IIA)” attribute of discrete choice logit models
does not apply.   On the supply side, retailers are assumed to price each product strategically,
2
taking into the account the effect of private label pricing on the demand for their own national
label products, and the competitive effect on store traffic vis a vis all other retailers in the market. 
Combining strategic pricing choices with an explicitly spatial demand model, the effect private
labels have on the prices of national brands derives from the extent to which retailers choose to
differentiate store brands from national brands, both horizontally and vertically.  In this way, we
are able to test each of the hypotheses regarding the economic rationale that underlies a private
label strategy outlined above.
Nested Logit Model of Private Label Demand 
Consumers are assumed to make hierarchical purchase decisions.  Because shopping trips
involve significant search and travel cost, consumers first choose whether to buy from a
supermarket or some other outlet, then choose among available stores and, once in the store,
choose from among the products that satisfy their various needs.    Therefore, we adopt a nested
3
logit approach to model the demand for private labels and national brands (McFadden, 1978).  A Many authors use a nested logit approach to study various applied problems in differentiated product
4
markets, particularly the automobile market.  Fershtman and Gandal (1998) study the Arab boycott’s impact on the
Israeli automobile market, Goldberg (1995) estimates a model of the U.S. automobile market and Verboven (1996)
the European car market.  Many consumer goods can also be logically segmented into separable groups, or nests
such as beer in the U.K. (Slade, 2004) or milk in the U.S. (Dhar and Cotterill, 2003).  
 While the propensity to substitute among products within a store is assumed to be greater than among
5
stores for each brand, this does not imply that there is no inter-store substitution.  By allowing for an upper-level
nest, we permit the data to determine the extent to which consumers shop among stores ex ante. 
6
nested logit model provides both an intuitive way of describing the consumer’s decision and
analytical solutions for the retailer’s profit maximizing positioning decision.   Partitioning
4
products by retail store represents a natural choice because consumers are more likely to
substitute among brands (in the same category) within a store than compare the same brand
among stores.  Although this assumption is common in the retail literature, and has ample
empirical support (Slade, 1995; Sudhir, 2001), we test its validity using the empirical model of
demand described next.   
5
The demand system implied by this nesting structure is represented using a DM extension
of the variance component formulation of Cardell (1997), Berry (1994) and Currie and Park
(2003).  Formally, mean utility for consumer h from consuming good i purchased in store j is a
ij function of a set of store and brand attributes (x ), its quality-adjusted price ( ) and
j unobservable factors. There are i = 1, 2, ..., I products in each of the j = 1, 2, ..., J stores.  Utility,
therefore, is written as:
1ij where î  is a random error that is unobserved by the econometrician, but reflects variables
known to the firm that influence the product’s price (for example, shelf space, supplier rebates,
ij ij or anticipated shortages).  The attribute vector x  includes binary private label (pl), store (st),
ij k brand (b ) and seasonal (se ) indicators, as well as an indicator of whether the product is offered
(1) Note that the discount variable is defined such that the price cut is temporary and not a permanent
6
reduction in shelf price.  The binary discount indicator assumes a value of 1.0 only if the price in the current week is
at least 5% below the previous and following week. 
 Our use of the term “quality” encompasses both horizontal and vertical differentiation as both dimensions
7
are likely to be important in private label competition (Choi and Coughlan, 2006).  
 Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992) develop a similar argument in geographic space in the context of a
8
spatial random utility model (P. 345). 
7
ij on a temporary discount (dc ), and an interaction term between the shelf price and the discount
ij ij (dc  p ).     
6
Quality depends on a product’s location in attribute space.   More precisely, each
7
consumer forms a perception of the extent to which a product is differentiated from others based
ijh on its distance, d , from all others.   Distance, or rather its analog in the spatial econometrics
8
literature, proximity, is measured in a number of ways (Anselin, 1988; Kalnins, 1993).  First, we
use three discrete measures of contiguity that reflect whether or not two products are of the same
brand, sell in the same store, or are of the same flavor.  For example, if ice cream i is made by
Ben and Jerry’s, and l is also made by Ben and Jerry’s then the il element of the “brand” distance
matrix takes a value of 1.0.  However, if i is the Chunky Monkey flavor, while l is Cherry Garcia,
then the il element of the “flavor” distance matrix is assigned a 0.  Second, we create a
continuous measure of distance in nutritional attribute space.  Defining the k nutritional attributes
as grams of fat, carbohydrates, protein and sodium as well as total calories, the il element of the
“nutrients” distance matrix is the inverse-Euclidean distance between the nutritional profile of
item i and item l, or:
Because (2) is defined it terms of inverse-distance, it represents a measure of how close the
(2) Following Slade (2004b), the main diagonal of the nutrient-distance matrix consists of own-nutrient
9
content because the distance between a product and itself is, by definition, zero.  This practice ensures non-
degenerate results, and means that the own-nutrient measures are interpreted as hedonic values.  
i  Slade (2004b) compares a nested logit model with á defined as a function of product characteristics to a
10
normalized quadratic DM model, but does not allow the price-response parameter to depend on the full matrix of
distances between products.  Not surprisingly, her model retains much of the inflexibility of a standard nested logit. 
8
products are in nutrient attribute space.  We then create a linear quality index that consists of all
four distance metrics and a constant term:
ij ij ij ij where st , b , f , and z  are elements of the store, brand, flavor and nutrient distance matrices,
respectively.  Next, we adjust all self prices by multiplying each by their respective quality index
ij so that:  where p  is the shelf price of product i in store j (Deaton and Muellbauer,
1980; Chiang, 1991).  By adjusting shelf prices for variations in quality, we capture the
expectation that consumers will respond differently to price changes for products nearer their
preferred quality over others that are more distant.   
9
Perhaps more importantly, however, by adopting a DM approach, we relax the restriction
imposed by the nested logit approach that “...the cross-price elasticity between [i,j] and [l,m] is
independent of [i,j]” (Slade, 2004b) and the proportionate draw problem within nests commonly
associated with the nested logit.   Synthesizing the DM and nested logit models in this way also
10
creates a simple and parsimonious way of ameliorating the dimensionality problem associated
with differentiated-products analysis by projecting the demand for goods into a smaller attribute
space, while retaining the discrete-choice nature, but not the estimating difficulties, associated
with the mixed logit model.     
ih ih In our nested logit specification, the distribution of v  is defined so that the term (v  + (1
(3) Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) derive a two-level version of the nested logit model that they apply to merger
11
j analysis in the European truck market.  In their model, the heterogeneity parameters (ó) are allowed to vary by
manufacturer.  In the current study, we are less concerned with variation in substitutability within stores than arriving
at a more general conclusion comparing inter- and intra-store substitution.  Verboven (1996) provides additional
detail on deriving a multi-product nested-logit equilibrium subject to binding output constrains.     
9
I ijh ijh - ó)å ) is extreme-value distributed if the household specific error term å  is itself extreme-
hj value distributed (Cardell, 1997).  Extending this logic to a second nesting level implies that v
hj J ih I J ijh also possess the unique distribution that causes v  + (1 - ó ) v  + (1 - ó) (1 - ó )å  to be extreme-
JI value distributed. The parameters ó  and ó that measure utility-correlation within each nest are
interpreted as measures of store and product heterogeneity – or more accurately the lack thereof –
IJ J respectively such that 0 # ó  # 1 and 0 # ó   # 1.   If ó  = 1, then the correlation among stores
I goes to 1.0 and stores are regarded as perfect substitutes, or if ó = 1, then products within each
store are perfect substitutes.   On the other hand, if these parameters each are zero, then the
11
model collapses to a simple multinomial logit model, without store or product nests. The ability
to estimate these parameters is a critical advantage of the nested logit model, because it ensures
that the DM specification estimates the extent of differentiation due to product attributes and not
to store or category heterogeneity.  By including an outside option, the nested logit model also
allows for general demand-expansion in addition to share-reallocation among stores and
products.  
Based on the random utility model in (1), define the level of mean utility for each choice
ij of product i and store j as:   where  á  is the marginal utility of income
ij multiplied by the quality index, ø .  Following Berry (1994), the marginal share of good i
purchased in store j is the product of the conditional share of good i given that a purchase was
made from store j, the conditional share of store j given that the purchase was made from a
supermarket, and the share of all supermarkets in the total market:  10
where:   is the inclusive value term for the conditional store choice and the
inclusive value term for the choice among products is:  .  Note that the
utility of the outside option, or no purchase, has been normalized to zero. Taking logs of both
sides of (4) leads to a share equation for product i in store j that is a function of the unobservable
inclusive values:
and substitution parameters at the product and store-levels.  Substituting expressions for the
aggregate supermarket share and the store (or supermarket chain) share into equation (5) and
simplifying gives the marginal share of product i in store j:
1ij where î  is the econometric error term described in (1) above.  
In the linear-demand DM used by Pinkse and Slade (2004) and Slade (2004b), the
demand for each product is a function of all other prices.  In this case, the flexibility of the matrix
of cross-price derivatives is clear.  On the other hand, the DM / NML model still involves only a
single price vector, so it is perhaps less clear how cross-price elasticities vary within and among
groups.  Because we project product demand into attribute distances rather than prices, however,




own-price elasticity is given by:
ij where the quality index now enters through the marginal utility of income, á .  Similarly, the
cross-price elasticity for products within-group (store) is:
for i  l and j = m.  The cross-price elasticity with respect to products in other stores is given by:
for i  l and j  m.  The elasticity expression in (9) shows that the cross-price elasticity of each
product depends not only on the share of the other store, but on the specific attributes of the l
product in the m store.  Thus, the DM extension to the NML model represents a simple,
parsimonious way of averting the well-known IIA problem of all fixed-coefficient logit models. 
Of perhaps greater importance, however, are the implications that derive from incorporating
attribute-distances into retailers’ supply decisions, particularly with respect to their positioning of
private labels.   
The Supply of Private Label Products




conditions under an assumed game for the retail price as a function of market share and price-
response elasticities, or (2) solve the first-order conditions for each retailer’s multi-product best-
reply function, or each of its prices as a function of all other prices in the game.  We follow
Sudhir (2001), Chintagunta, Bonfrer and Song (2002), Villas-Boas (2003), Villas-Boas and Zhao
(2005), Slade (2004b) and many others in estimating a structural model of retailer conduct.  Our
innovation is to develop and estimate a supply model that is consistent with the DM/NML
specification introduced above.  Because price response depends on the distance between
products in attribute space, the supply model takes into account the effect of product positioning
on market power – both horizontally among stores and vertically with suppliers.  The equilibrium
concept is Bertrand-Nash, so retailers compete in prices, both of national brand products and
their own store brands.  
Supermarket retailers are assumed to maximize category profits within each store by
choosing national brand and private label prices.  Unlike Chintagunta, Bonfrer and Song (2002),
who model retailer margins before and after the introduction of a private label product to
determine its effect on market power in the vertical channel, the retailers in the current sample
use private labels throughout the sample period.  Therefore, pricing conduct is modeled as a
function of distance in discrete private label, store, brand, flavor and continuous attribute space. 
More formally, the profit equation for retailer j selling in a particular category m is:
m ijm where Q  is the size of the total category, r  is the wholesale price of item i in category m and
ijm jm store j, c is the marginal retailing cost, and F  is the fixed costs of operating the store that are
allocated to category m.  Unit retailing costs C(q,w) are assumed to be of a Normalized Quadratic
(NQ) form, with output vector q and input prices w so that the marginal cost function for
(10)13
products in each category is written as:
0l for some normalizing input price vector, w .  In (11), ã are parameters to be estimated and
  As is well understood, the regularity conditions for a well-behaved dual cost
function can be tested and imposed during estimation for the NQ functional form.
Each retailer is assumed to maximize profits on a category-by-category basis, choosing
the prices of all products in the category simultaneously.  This is consistent with the practice of
category management now used by a majority of supermarket retailers and implies that managers,
at least implicitly, take into account all of the cross-price effects that are involved in setting the
price for any single product.  Adopting a portfolio approach to retail pricing decisions means that
retail managers internalize any local monopoly power they may have over shoppers who do not
shop for individual items (Bliss, 1988; Nevo, 2001).  Consequently, the first order conditions for
each product i in category m for the manager of store j are written as (suppressing the category
index):
In this expression, the number of products can conceivably vary among stores, so there are a total
j of I items per store, and J stores.  Assuming the number of products per store is a constant, I, and
lj J stores in total, then define Ù as an IJ x IJ matrix with Ù  = 1 if i and l are two products sold by
lj the same firm, and  Ù  = 0 if not (Nevo, 2001).  In this way, (12) captures the essential multi-
product nature of retailing while allowing for a general pattern of product interactions in
 Because retailers are assumed to solve the first order conditions in (12)
(11)
(12) The expressions are straightforward and are available from the authors. 
12
14
simultaneously, the solution is simplified considerably by using matrix notation such that:
where p is a vector of prices, r is a vector of wholesale prices, c is a vector of marginal costs, and
p S  is an IJ x IJ matrix of price derivatives with typical element:  Solving for (p - r - c)
from (13) yields an estimable form of the structural model with margins as endogenous left-side
variables and only the matrix of price-responses and market shares on the right-side:
p in the form of the familiar mark-up rule.  The precise form of each element of S  depends upon
whether the products i and l are in the same store, different stores, or outside of the set of all
products purchased at supermarkets in general.   Substituting these expressions into (14)
12
provides an econometric model that is able to capture horizontal product-interactions within and
among retailers, but not between retailers and manufacturers.   
Our model of strategic behavior in private labels also includes their impact on vertical
relationships with suppliers.  Typically, research in this area considers highly simplified
environments in which there is either a monopoly retailer (Chintagunta, Bonfrer and Song, 2002;
Villas-Boas and Zhao, 2005) or a single, price-taking manufacturer (Besanko, Gupta and Jain,
1998).  More realistically, however, competing manufacturers sell to retailers who also compete
among themselves.  Moreover, as private label suppliers, retailers also compete with their own
manufacturers.  Consequently, we develop a general model of vertical interaction for each retailer
that subsumes both strategic pricing behavior and product design. 
j Assume each manufacturer is responsible for a single product, so there are i = 1, 2, ... I
(13)
(14)15
firms in the market. We extend the single-retailer model of Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005) to
include multiple retailers so that the profit of supplier i is given by: 
ij i where b is the marginal cost of manufacturing product i, and H is the fixed cost of production. 
Manufacturers choose their selling prices and, given the maintained assumption that they
compete vertically as Stackelberg leaders (Sudhir, 2001) must take retailer’s pricing decisions
into account: both for their own product and others’ products.  The first order conditions for this
problem are:
which is then solved for the manufacturing margin as a function of the sensitivity of market share
to price and of retail price to wholesale price (pass-through): 
The solution to equation (17), however, includes a parameter that is not provided in the data – the
pass-through rate.  Consequently, Sudhir (2001) and Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005) show that
 can be expressed in terms of estimated parameters by totally differentiating the first-
order condition for the optimal retail price given by (12) above with respect to the wholesale
price charged by each manufacturer.  While they consider a single retailer, however, we extend
their approach to allow for manufacturers that sell to multiple retailers.  Consequently, suppliers
(15)
(16)
(17)pp   To better understand the difference between L  and S , the former represents column i of the latter, a
13
vector that shows how the share of each product i changes with respect to the prices of all other products, in all other
retailers.  The specific form of the elements of G are straightforward and are available from the authors. 
16
must take into account not only the impact of changes in their wholesale price on the retail price
of other suppliers’ products, but on the price of their own products set by other retailers. 
Formally, differentiating (12) with respect to the wholesale price of product i, the impact of a
price change for each product i sold by retailer j is given by: 
In matrix notation, define the gradient vectors  , and   for each retailer j,
and an IJ x IJ matrix G with typical (ij,lm) element given by: 
p then equation (18) is re-written:   where the IJ vector L  on the right side of (18)
describes how the share of product i in store j changes with the prices of all other products in all
other stores.   We then solve for the unknown matrix of wholesale price responses as:
13
so the supplier margin in equation (17) is re-written in matrix notation as: 
With the wholesale price written in terms of estimable retail-demand parameters, the retail price
in (14) can then be written in reduced form as:
(18)
(19)
(20) Note that our definition of a conduct parameter is not analogous to a conjectural variation in the sense of
14
Bresnahan (1989) as applied by, for example, Kadiyali, Chintagunta and Vilcassim (2000) in a context similar to the
current one.  Rather, we maintain Bertrand-Nash behavior throughout so that tests of the significance of the conduct
parameter are tests of the structure of the maintained model.  Corts (1999), among others, criticizes the interpretation
of conduct parameters as conjectural variations as a conjecture is a fundamentally dynamic concept while the model
is static.  Including these parameters in the econometric model, however, allows the researcher to avoid imposing a
particularly restrictive form of the game being played on the model.  In this way, the nature of the game is
determined by the data. 
17
so p - c represents an IJ x 1 vector of retail margins.
Without further modification, (21) describes the set of retailers as competing in a perfect
Nash fashion.  However, empirical evidence shows that this is not likely the case (Richards and
Patterson, 2005).  Therefore, we follow Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005) and Chintagunta, Bonfrer
and Song (2002) and allow for departures from strict Nash behavior by interacting each element
pi j of the share-response matrix S  with a conduct parameter (1/ö ).   The conduct parameter
14
measures any deviation of retail-wholesale margins from the competitive benchmark.  In this
case, excess margins may be due to vertical interactions between retailers and suppliers that are
not, in fact, Bertrand-Nash.  Or, because our model has multiple retailers, non-zero conduct
parameters may also be due to the nature of the game played among stores in the retail market.  
Deviations from Bertrand-Nash behavior, however, are not likely to be constant across
stores or products.  Rather, if conduct is thought to depend on the extent of product and store
differentiation as theoretical models of private label rivalry suggest, then it should be modeled as
such (Choi and Coughlan, 2006).  Therefore, each conduct parameter is written as a linear
function of the set of discrete and continuous distance metrics defined above.  Most importantly,
by including a discrete private-label indicator among the distance metrics, we are able to
determine whether or the pricing decision for a particular product depends upon whether it is a
private label, or national brand.  In this way, we not only estimate the presence or absence of
(21)18
market power, but also its source.  Including the entire set of distance metrics, the conduct
parameter in inter-store competition is written: 
i where each of the g( ) functions are measures of contiguity or distance as defined above.  Tests
ij of overall retailer conduct thus depend on the entire ö  function and not an individual parameter. 
ij For example, if ö  = 1.0 for all products i in retailer j, then the retailer internalizes all pricing
externalities associated with his or her own products (maximizes category profits), and those sold
ij other stores (collusive oligopolist).  If, on the other hand, ö  > 1.0, the retailer prices above
Bertrand and is clearly playing some other, more cooperative game than the Nash equilibrium
1 envisioned here.  Given this insight, if the parameter ö  is greater than zero then a private label
strategy allows the retailer to price above the Bertrand-Nash level.  With only a single retailer,
ij Chintagunta, Bonfrer and Song (2002) interpret a ö  less than 1.0 after a private label has been
introduced as evidence of “softening” competitive interactions between the retailer and
manufacturers.  However, in the multiple-retailer case considered here a similar result implies
that raising private label share raises margins due to greater store differentiation, customer
loyalty, a better reputation for quality or any one of a number of other competitive rationales for
using private labels.  
Theoretical models of private label use also cite their impact on vertical competition with
suppliers (Mills, 1995; Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer, 2004).  In order to test the hypotheses that
private label introduction increases retailer market power vis a vis suppliers and reduces the
double-marginalization problem, we parameterize the departure of wholesale margins from a
Bertrand-Nash benchmark.  This is accomplished by introducing a second conduct function in the
manufacturer-markup term in equation (21).  As in the retailer-level case, the impact of private
(22)19
label proliferation, individual store, brand, and flavor effects and the level of product
ij differentiation (distance in attribute space) on manufacturer conduct is captured by allowing è  to
depend on each of the distance metrics defined above:   
Because manufacturers sell to a number of different retailers, we implicitly assume that
manufacturer conduct varies by store and brand, and that flavor and nutritional attributes have an
impact on their ability to charge higher wholesale prices.  Further, we also assume that retailers’
use of private labels has a different effect on each manufacturer. These are testable hypotheses.  
Defining vectors of length NM of both conduct parameters, the estimated version of (21)
then becomes:
ij Unlike the conjectural variations case, there is no direct interpretation of è .  However, we can
ij infer the degree of market power exercised by a wholesaler by comparing è  to competitive and
ij monopolistic bounds.  Namely, if è  = 1.0, then the manufacturer of product i does indeed set its
ij wholesale price to retailer j according to the hypothesized Nash solution.  On the other hand, if è
= 0, then the manufacturer sets prices competitively as the elements of (23) apparently do not
ij contribute to effective differentiation and, hence, upstream market power.  If è  < 1, then we can
conclude that the manufacturer of i prices below Nash.  In fact, Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005)
speculate that this may be due to long-term contracting incentives, but is more likely due to
retailer market power.  Most important for our objective of understanding the role of private label
1 products, if the interaction parameter è  > 0.0, then private labels earn higher manufacturer
margins (for the retailer-manufacturer) relative to national brands.  If private labels earn greater
(23)
(24) The evidence on manufacturer market power is only indirect because the private label effect on upstream
15
market power is defined relative to a national brand benchmark.  Therefore, if private labels have a positive effect on
upstream margins, they must have a negative effect on national brand margins, by definition.   
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upstream margins, then this provides evidence that manufacturer market power is lower when
private label products are introduced in a given category.   A similar interpretation applies to
15
5 each of the other elements of (23).  For example, è  measures the effect of product differentiation
ij 5 on manufacturer margins.  Because z  is defined in terms of inverse distance (proximity), if è  >
0.0 then the closer products are in attribute space, the higher are manufacturer margins.  In the
next section, we explain how each of the conduct parameters is identified in a relatively simple
two-stage estimation procedure. 
Estimation of the DM / NML Private-Label Model
Data Description
The data for this analysis were obtained from Fresh Look Marketing, Inc. (FLM) of Chicago,
Illinois.  FLM provided weekly price, volume and promotional information for all ice cream
UPCs for all retail accounts in the Visalia, CA market for the two year (104 week) period from
May 31, 2003 through June 1, 2005.  Although our data set consists of similar scanner data for all
categories in the store, we chose ice cream for a number of reasons.  First, private label products
play an important role in retailers’ ice cream category strategies as ice cream ranks among the top
five among all categories in terms of private label penetration (FMI).  Second, the market
includes two large national brand manufacturers who compete through a variety of mechanisms:
product innovation, retail promotion, pricing, shelf placement and trade promotion and two
premium brands that occupy a niche market decidedly above that of the national brands.  Third, Our retail scanner data coverage is complete for all traditional supermarket retailers.  Other sources of ice
16
cream supply include warehouse stores, convenience stores, food service outlets or shoppers who travel to other
towns to shop.  These sources of supply together form the outside option in the nested logit model of demand. 
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ice cream manufacturers actively differentiate their products through a number of nutritional,
ingredient, processing, packaging and labeling techniques.  In most retail stores, differentiation
means that the category consists of products with significantly different nutritional profiles,
ingredient lists and production methods.  Finally, the number of unique SKUs is relatively small,
allowing for the specification of a DM model that captures the spatial dimension of ice cream
rivalry in a parsimonious way.  
There are also a number of reasons why Visalia, CA was chosen to serve as a test market
for estimating the spatial private label model.  First, selecting a small market is necessary in order
to have store-level data from all major sources of ice cream supply in the market.   Second, there
16
are no Wal-Mart stores in Visalia.  This fact is important because Wal-Mart does not supply
retail scanner data to data syndication firms such as FLM so our data set does not contain the
“Wal-Mart gap” that is typical of other scanner-data studies.  Third, the retailers in Visalia each
follow a HI-LO pricing strategy wherein they maintain relatively high everyday shelf prices, but
then periodically reduce prices in order to increase store traffic, feature a certain brand, introduce
a new brand, or a number of other reasons.  This is essential over a relatively short panel data set
in order to have price variation at the brand level.  Fourth, Visalia is relatively isolated, so
geographic competition from supermarkets in other towns is likely to be limited.  In demographic
terms, Visalia is similar to the broader U.S. in terms of income, age distribution and education,
but consists of a significantly greater proportion of Hispanic shoppers.  Therefore, to the extent
that Hispanic ice cream buying behavior differs from the general population, or results can only
be generalized with significant caution.
When estimating a DM model, defining the set of product attributes and distance Results from other DM specifications are available from the authors. 
17
 Sodium is excluded from the list of nutrients on the main diagonal of the distance matrix because it was
18
not statistically significant in preliminary specification tests.  
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measures is critically important because they form the basis of our definition of how ice creams
are differentiated.  In order to capture the source of this differentiation, we chose from a set of
macronutrients (fat, carbohydrates and protein), sub-components of the macronutrients (saturated
fat, trans-fat, sugars), micronutrients (sodium and caffeine), the presence or absence of key
ingredients (skim milk, whole milk, sugar, and flavoring), a brand identifier, and a flavor
indicator.  We also experiment with a number of different distance metrics, including inverse
Euclidean distance (proximity), exponential distance, or whether two products are nearest
neighbors or share a common boundary in attribute space.  Pinkse, Slade and Brett (2002)
provide a thorough discussion of how these metrics are defined.  While the discrete measures of
contiguity (brand, flavor, store, private label) were included on a priori grounds, we ultimately
chose from among the possible attribute-distance specifications on the basis of a quasi-likelihood
ratio (QLR) testing procedure (Gallant and Jorgenson, 1979).   In the final model, the set of
17
attributes consists of total calories, fat (grams), carbohydrates (grams), protein (grams) and
sodium (milligrams) per serving and proximity is defined as inverse Euclidean distance.   
18
On the supply side, the marginal cost function is estimated with input prices  from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, including raw milk for manufacturing purposes, high-fructose corn
syrup, milk-product manufacturing labor, an energy-price index and producer price indices for
ice cream and chocolate production.  Table 1 provides summary statistics for all of the major
variables used in the study.
[table 1 in here] Chintagunta, Bonfrer and Song (2002) take a similar two-stage approach, but use fundamentally different
19
methods.  Specifically, they employ a random coefficients logit approach similar to Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes
(1995) to explicitly allow for unobserved consumer heterogeneity.  
23
Estimation Procedure
There are four complications that must be addressed prior to estimating the demand (6) and
pricing (24) equations.  First, the share equation cannot be estimated using ordinary least squares
1ij because prices are likely to be correlated with some of the elements of ç  – promotional
activities, in-store merchandising and other strategies cause price and market share to be jointly
endogenous.  Second, the spatial nature of the demand equation in (6) means that successive
observations will be spatially correlated, a situation that gives rise to the same econometric
problems as autocorrelation in a time-series context (Slade, 2004a).  Third, the richness of the
nested logit model means that the pricing block for individual brands is highly complex and non-
linear, requiring a non-linear estimator.  The fourth complication is not necessarily endemic to
the problem, but is rather a preference – given that the pricing model is non-linear, it would be
desirable to use an estimation method that is not overly restrictive. 
To develop tractable solutions to each of these estimation problems, we adopt two-stage
approach, estimating demand (6) in the first-stage and the pricing model in the second stage. 
Although simultaneous estimation of demand and pricing is preferable on efficiency grounds, the
two-stage estimator is consistent and, most importantly, allows us to address the more serious
issues outlined above in a manner that is computationally feasible.   We address the first
19
complication (endogeneity) by using an instrumental variables estimator for the demand
equation.  Specifically, we use a generalized methods of moment (GMM) estimator with
instruments constructed from input prices as well as attributes, prices and marketing activities
from products sold in other stores.  While this approach is well accepted in the structural
modeling literature, it is much more intuitive in a DM context.  Specifically, by defining spatial The term “weight matrix” refers to a matrix with typical element, in the nutrient case, of the inverse
20
Euclidean distance between a pair of products.  For estimation purposes, the matrix is row-normalized to permit
more intuitive interpretation of the spatial regression parameters. 
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weight matrices formed from various distance metrics among items in each store, it is a simple
matter to form instruments by interacting rival prices and exogenous variables with each weight
matrix.   Kelejian and Prucha (1998) adopt this approach in deriving their spatial GMM
20
estimator.  
We address the likelihood that the demands for specific ice cream items are spatially
ij correlated in two ways.  First, as explained above, we allow embodied quality, ø , to depend on a
set of distance metrics that reflect each product’s proximity to others in terms of store, brand,
flavor, private label and nutritional attributes.  Second, given that the empirical model is
inherently spatial, we allow the errors in the demand equation (6) to be spatially autocorrelated,
with the strength of correlation dependent on each product’s distance from all others in attribute
space.  Note that the spatial weight matrix constructed for this purpose does not necessarily have
to be the same as that used to define the distance metrics in the demand equation itself.  In fact,
because the demand equation uses several weight matrices, doing so would not be feasible
(Kalnins, 1993).  Consequently, we assume that the attribute distance metric represents the most
general definition and define M as the spatial weight matrix used to test for spatially
autocorrelated errors.  
Spatial autocorrelation implies that:  so a test of the null hypothesis, ë = 0, of
no spatial autocorrelation consists of a test of the significance of  ë.  Although there are a number
of alternative tests that are appropriate for this purpose, the Moran (I) statistic is widely used and
generally accepted (Anselin, 1988).  Moran’s I is given in vector notation by:  which
is distributed standard normal after transforming according to:  25
where:   X is a matrix of all explanatory variables in (6), n is the number
of observations, k is the number of regressors, and m = (n - k)(n - k + 2).  A failure to reject the
null in this case means that the spatial demand model must be estimated under the assumption
that each weekly observation is spatially independent of all others. 
In the second stage, similar estimation concerns apply to the pricing model.  Namely,
elements of both the retailer and manufacturer margin specifications are inherently endogenous
so least squares estimation will again yield biased estimates.  Further, because both conduct
functions depend on the distance between all products in several dimensions, spatial dependence
arises here as well.  Consequently, we adopt a similar GMM approach as in the demand side, but
define the set of instruments appropriate to the pricing equation.  In particular, we choose a set of
instruments that consist of brand, flavor, store and private label indicators, continuous values of
each attribute, and spatially-weighted values of each discrete and continuous distance metric. 
We also include non-linear functions of these distance metrics, again in a manner similar to
Kelejian and Prucha (1998).  As on the demand side, we also test the pricing equation errors for
spatial autocorrelation given our implicit assumption that product pricing is likely to be
correlation across spatial dimensions.    
Results and Discussion
The key hypotheses of this study are tested using the results of the pricing model.  However,
because the demand estimates constitute critical input for the pricing equation, we begin the
(26) Bresnahan, Stern and Trajtenberg (1997) develop a “principles of differentiation” model that accounts
21
for such non-hierarchical discrete choices.  In the current application, however, it is more likely the case that
consumers choose stores for fundamentally different reasons from those used to select a brand of ice cream. 
26
presentation of results with a series of specification tests of the spatial demand model. 
Moreover, given the richness of the DM/NML specification, the first stage of the estimation
procedure also provides many results that are likely to be of inherent interest, regardless of their
implications for strategic pricing. 
The first specification test concerns the presence or absence of spatial autocorrelation in
the demand errors.  Using the Moran I statistic introduced above, we find a test statistic value of
1.45.  Given that the critical value from a standard normal distribution at a 5% level is 1.96, we
fail to reject the null of no spatial autocorrelation.  Consequently, all subsequent specification
tests are performed with the GMM DM model uncorrected for spatial autocorrelation. 
Next, we test whether our particular form of the nested logit model is an appropriate
representation of ice cream demand.  Draganska and Mazzeo (2003) estimate a single-retailer
nested model of ice cream demand in which consumers choose brands and flavors in a
hierarchical structure.  Although they find that a brand-then-flavor model is preferred to the
flavor-then-brand alternative, it is more likely the case that these two sources of differentiation
are evaluated simultaneously.   In table 2, the significance of both g(b) and g(f) suggest that
21
differences in brand and flavor are both important in determining choice probabilities.  As a more
I direct test of the nesting structure used here, recall that if ó = 0 consumers do not substitute
J among products within a store, so a single-level store-based logit model is appropriate and if ó  =
0 consumers do not substitute among stores, so a single-level product-based logit would be
preferred.  The results in table 2 show that neither of these cases apply.  In the GMM estimates,
IJ both  ó and ó  are significantly different from zero so both the set of products and stores consist
of viable, yet imperfect, substitutes.  1  The test statistic is calculated as:   where â  is the vector of GMM
22
01 0 parameters,  â  is the vector of OLS parameters, V  is the GMM covariance matrix, V  is the OLS covariance matrix,
and there are K degrees of freedom, where K is the number of parameters in the model.   
27
[table 2 in here]  
The results in table 2 demonstrate the effect of defining product differentiation in
explicitly spatial terms by comparing parameter estimates from spatial and non-spatial OLS
specifications.  Although there is a relatively small difference between the spatial and non-spatial
price-response and heterogeneity parameters, failing to account for the spatial dependence in
demand reverses the sign of the private label effect.  Further, the non-spatial model understates
the promotion effect and the degree of substitutability among stores – both important results from
a managerial perspective. 
The least squares estimates, however, are likely to be biased if retail prices and promotion
strategies are endogenous.  Villas-Boas and Winer (1999) describe a number of reasons why we
may expect this to be the case a priori in a retail environment.  Nonetheless, it is preferable to
test before potentially applying an estimator that is less efficient than is necessary.  Formally, we
examine the data for price endogeneity using Hausman’s (1978) general specification test.  This
test involves comparing the parameters of two models: one that is consistent under both the null
and alternative hypotheses and one that is asymptotically efficient under the alternative
hypothesis.   For current purposes, the efficient estimator is OLS and the consistent one is
22
GMM.  Based on the estimates in table 2, the calculated test statistic value is 284.01, while the
critical chi-square value with 39 degrees of freedom at a 5% level is 54.29.  Therefore, we can
reject the null of no endogeneity and conclude that the GMM estimator is preferred.  Comparing
the spatial OLS and GMM estimates reveals the extent of endogeneity bias.  Most importantly,
the private label effect in the GMM model is nearly double the OLS estimate, and is significantly
different from zero – unlike the OLS case.  Further, the OLS brand and flavor distance28
parameters are insignificant, while they are strongly significant in the GMM model.  Finally,
demand is also much more sensitive to price, but less to temporary promotions, in the model that
corrects for endogeneity.  This is consistent with findings reported by Villas-Boas and Zhao
(2005) and prior expectations. 
The demand estimates in table 2 provide other parameters of interest.  First, note that the
nested logit scale parameters indicate a greater willingness to substitute among products within
IJ stores (ó) than among products in different stores (ó ).  While this outcome is, in fact, necessary
for the nested logit model to be consistent with the random utility assumption (Anderson and de
J Palma, 1992) many authors assume that ó  is equal to zero (Sudhir, 2001; Chintagunta, Bonfrer
and Song, 2005).  Assuming no substitution among stores justifies their use of single-retailer
J scanner data even in multi-retailer markets.  Consequently, finding a value for ó  significantly
different from zero constitutes a valuable contribution to the literature.  
Second, three of the four distance metrics are significantly different from zero.  The
distance metric parameters are interpreted as indicating the effect of proximity for the continuous
measure and contiguity for the discrete.  For example, a positive coefficient on the brand
indicator suggests that carrying more of the same brand generates a positive market share effect. 
Further, controlling for brand proximity, carrying more items of the same flavor also causes
market share to rise.  This result is analogous to the descriptive finding of Draganska and Mazzeo
(2003) who find that retailers tend not to sell two ice creams of the same flavor from different
brands, avoiding the potential for cannibalism across product lines.  While brand, flavor and
store are likely dimensions of product differentiation, manufacturers regard the nutritional
content of their product as the principal agent of product design. Therefore, the strongly negative
coefficient on attribute distance is of critical importance, implying that the closer (farther) a
product is to others in terms of its nutritional profile, the lower (higher) is market share.  This is29
the primary intent of differentiating one ice cream from another.
Third, the quality parameters indicate how price response varies with an ice cream’s own
nutritional attributes and its distance from all others.  The parameter estimates in table 2 indicate
that nutritional attributes are critical determinants of price-elasticity.  In particular, high-calorie
and high-protein ice creams are significantly more price-elastic than high-fat and high
carbohydrate (sugar) ice creams, ceteris paribus.  Evidence from the nutritional literature
suggests that fat and sugar are highly addictive nutrients, so the relative inelasticity of high fat
and sugar ice creams is perhaps to be expected. 
Using these price-response estimates and the elasticity expressions given above, table 3
shows part of the demand elasticity matrix for one retailer.  As in other attribute-based estimation
methods (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995), these results show that products of the same brand,
flavor and, hence, nutritional profile, tend to be closer substitutes than those that are less
contiguous.  How this proximity influences pricing decisions, however, remains to be seen.
[table 3 in here]
Two supply-side models were estimated, one assuming competitive upstream interactions
and the other assuming a more general game.  The precise nature of the general game is
estimated as a parametric function of a set of distance metrics.  Both models parameterize
downstream conduct among retailers, with estimates of each appearing in table 4.  In the first
model, the fitted value of ö indicates the net effect of all influences on retail margins.  If the null
0 hypothesis is H : ö = 0, the test becomes a joint test of retailers’ ability to manage the category so
as to maximize profit (act as local monopolists over their own customers) and set prices in
cooperation with other store owners.  Given the estimate of 0.309, therefore, retailers appear to
be either imperfect category managers or relatively non-cooperative price rivals.  Disaggregating
this parameter into its component parts provides more information in this regard.  Because the30
store effect (contiguity with other products in the same store) is strongly positive (3.184), this
means that the value of ö for products sold in the same store is indeed very close to 1.0.  Said
differently, if we isolate the category management effect, retailers appear to maximize profit
within their own store.  Moreover, retailers tend to price products that are similar to others in
attribute space in a cooperative way, charging higher margins on products that are similar to
others.  This is true even after controlling for any possible brand-contiguity effects as two
premium ice creams will command high margins, no matter who the manufacturer.  Somewhat
surprisingly, private labels have no apparent impact on retailer pricing in this model.  However,
this may be due to the fact that this specification does not also account for their role in
moderating upstream rivalry. 
[table 4 in here]
Based on the quasi-likelihood ratio test reported in table 4, we reject a model that
includes only downstream pricing in favor of one that includes both downstream and upstream
pricing.  Overall, manufacturers tend to earn significantly more than competitive margins, but
less than if they had monopolized the upstream channel ( ).  Considering the individual
determinants of upstream and downstream conduct, the downstream store and attribute effects
remain qualitatively similar to the retail-margin model, but private labels appear to play a more
important role.  Specifically, retailers tend to take lower retail margins on private label products,
but make much higher margins in their role as private label manufacturers (4.469 upstream vs -
1.188 downstream).  It is important to interpret this parameter carefully.  While it is tempting to
infer that this result means private label introduction raises all manufacturer margins (counter to
orthodoxy), it implies instead that private label products provide their manufacturers higher
margins relative to national brands.  The explanation for why is straightforward and consistent
with the theoretical literature.  Because we account for private label design through the attribute31
distance variable, much of the downstream margin premium is created by imitating successful
national brands (Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer, 2004 and others).  The mere fact that the product
is a private label does not increase retail margins.  Upstream, however, private labels earn their
manufacturers high margins because: (1) to the extent that retailers are their own manufacturers,
they earn greater share of the total margin, and (2) to the extent that they contract with others,
they are able to extract better contract terms by selling their own brands.  Although we cannot
directly test the impact of private label usage on upstream market power, it is also likely that
some of the private label margin premium is due to their ability to increase retailers’ bargaining
power with manufacturers of other products, or soften upstream competition in the terminology
of Chintagunta, Bonfrer and Song (2002).
Among other important factors influencing upstream market power, if a retailer purchases
a number of brands from the same manufacturer (brand contiguity), then upstream margins rise –
perhaps due to opportunistic behavior on the part of manufacturers with customers who are
clearly dependent upon their brand.  More likely, this “brand effect” reflects a fundamental value
of brand proliferation in the channel as multiple brands are able to internalize upstream pricing
externalities that would otherwise go to competing brands.  The opposite effect appears if a
number of stores purchase from the same manufacturer.  If a manufacturer has broad distribution,
then the trade off it faces is through lower margins, reflecting the fact that retailers are more
likely to be able to force lower wholesale prices if all are selling the same product.  Interestingly,
attribute distance does not play an important role in determining manufacturer margins. 
The implications of these results go far beyond the private label ice cream case.  In fact,
ice cream is likely to be representative of the entire class of private label products given that the
underlying economics depend little on the nature of the product.  First, the growing trend toward
private-label proliferation is easily explained by the impact of private label usage on upstream32
margins (FMI).  Second, manufacturers are fighting the growth in private labels by accelerating
the rate of product innovation, creating new products that they hope retailers cannot imitate
quickly and successfully.  However, distancing new products from competitive private labels in
attribute space is only likely to attract market share, but not raise margins.  In fact, margins on
these new products are ultimately going to be below more imitative versions.  Third, our results
show that manufacturers have an incentive to focus distribution on individual retail clients, and
avoid selling the same brands and flavors to different accounts.  Such “mass customization” is
common in many other categories and retail environments beyond the ice cream aisle in the
supermarket.      
Conclusions and Implications
This study represents an empirical analysis of the role played by private label products in retail
demand and in retail and manufacturer pricing.  By focusing on private label and national brands
of ice cream sold through all supermarkets in a single, relatively small, non-Wal Mart market, we
are able to estimate the effect of private label usage on competition among retail stores and in
vertical relationships between retailers and manufacturers.  As such, this is the first empirical
study to explicitly consider the effect private labels on competition among stores.  
The demand model is a distance metric nested logit model (DM / NML) in which prices
are adjusted to account for variations in quality, where quality is defined by the distance between
products in attribute space.  In this way, we avoid the usual IIA criticism of the nested logit
model.  Moreover, whereas most theoretical and empirical models of retail variety define variety
in terms of the number of distinct products, in this model we explicitly consider the distance
between products in attribute, flavor, brand and store space.  The DM / NML model is estimated33
using a GMM approach in order to account for the endogeneity of both prices and product
attributes.  
The empirical results provide a number of important insights.  First, we answer the
question raised in the introduction as to whether private labels are effective in increasing market
share in horizontal competition, market power in vertical competition, both or neither.  In short,
private labels are most effective in stealing business from rivals, but can contribute to market
power if they are located near to national brands in characteristic space.  Second, as a corollary
we find that differentiation per se is not effective in increasing margins – at either the
manufacturer or retailer level.  Rather, the pricing model results indicate that imitative ice creams
tend to earn higher retail margins.  Third, private label ice creams tend to earn lower retail
margins due to their value-price positioning, but higher total margins because they increase
retailers’ vertical market power over contract manufacturers, and provide retailers a means of
internalizing the manufacturing margin.  Fourth, although we cannot test directly for the effect of
private labels on national brand margins, part of the private label benefit may also be due to their
impact on retailers’ bargaining power with national brand manufacturers.  Brands with wider
retail distribution tend to earn lower manufacturer margins due to their ubiquity in the channel,
but store-focused brands tend to be more profitable due to the importance retailers place on brand
exclusivity.  Brand-proliferation within single stores also appears to be a profitable means of
combating retailers’ private label strategies. 
These results hold many implications for retailer and manufacturer strategy.  While the
incentives that are driving private label proliferation are clear, the rationality of manufacturers’
response, that is creating new, differentiated products, is less obvious.  New products may help
build market share, but will earn below-average margins.  The net effect may not justify high
research and development expenditures.   From a retailer’s perspective, the upstream benefits to34
introducing private label products are well understood, but their downstream role may be more
complicated than is currently believed.  Simply introducing a private label is not enough as its
design is of critical importance.  Namely, as other research has shown – using far different
methods than used here – the closer private labels are to other products, the more profitable they
will be. 35
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Table 1. Summary of Supermarket Data: Visalia, CA, May 31, 2003 - June 1, 2005
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Product Sales ($ '000) 22032 $119.27 $457.35 $0.00 $6,038.90
Product Volume ('000 oz) 22032 1,997.80 7,000.20 0.00 102,470.00
Store Volume ('000 oz) 22032 71,921.00 26,888.00 18,536.00 174,460.00
Store Sales ($ '000) 22032 $4,293.80 $1,688.40 $1,232.50 $9,587.70
Market Volume ('000 oz) 22032 431,530.00 83,754.00 297,330.00 642,790.00
Market Sales ($ '000) 22032 $25,763.00 $4,589.20 $18,390.00 $35,785.00
Store Share 22032 0.03 0.26 0.00 0.59
Market Share 22032 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.16
Price ($/oz) 22032 $0.11 $0.08 $0.02 $0.27
Probability of Discount 22032 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
Milk Price ($ / gal.) 22032 $3.08 $0.25 $2.67 $3.57
Diesel Price ($ / gal.) 22032 $2.03 $0.40 $1.58 $3.00
HFCS Price (Index) 22032 131.81 0.67 130.60 133.50
Dairy Wage ($ / wk.) 22032 $680.34 $12.75 $653.66 $706.85
Chocolate PPI 22032 155.40 1.30 152.90 159.10
Ice Cream PPI (Index) 22032 164.84 3.21 160.30 168.20
Calories 22032 171.30 54.44 80.00 300.00
Total Fat (gms.) 22032 9.24 4.21 0.00 21.00
Sodium (mgms.) 22032 52.52 19.35 15.00 120.00
Carbohydrates (gms.) 22032 19.54 5.17 10.00 32.00
Sugars (gms.) 22032 15.34 5.24 3.00 30.00
Protein (gms.) 22032 2.91 1.08 1.00 5.0042







Variable Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
a
Albertsons 0.069* 7.893 -0.072* -4.352 -0.087* -9.237
Ralphs -0.313* -37.830 -0.088* -3.996 -0.189* -13.748
Vons -0.114* -13.700 -0.087* -3.933 -0.093* -11.602
SaveMart 1 -0.380* -58.040 0.148* 6.069 0.157* 9.678
SaveMart 2 -0.267* -41.320 0.071* 3.655 0.069* 6.244
Winter -0.032* -5.828 -1.391* -20.854 -1.471* -30.565
Spring -0.093* -16.920 -1.434* -21.136 -1.520* -31.677
Fall -0.046* -8.301 -1.424* -21.608 -1.526* -31.710
Albertsons: Private Label 1 -0.149* -15.530 -0.002 -0.064 0.041* 3.726
Albertsons: Private Label 2 -0.372* -29.490 -0.133* -3.279 0.118* 3.668
Albertsons: Private Label 3 -0.413* -33.930 -0.200* -5.239 -0.029 -1.009
Breyers -0.082* -5.028 0.050 1.026 0.025 1.473
Dreyers -0.093* -5.527 -0.006 -0.120 -0.001 -0.054
Ben & Jerrys 0.021 1.251 0.117* 2.414 0.048* 2.699
Haagen Dazs 0.295* 19.770 0.426* 10.432 0.468* 27.116
Kroger: Private Label 1 -0.112* -6.881 0.083 1.943 0.138* 8.284
Kroger: Private Label 2 -0.147* -7.395 0.011 0.206 0.102* 4.518
Kroger: Private Label 3 0.001 0.069 0.096* 1.963 0.043* 2.612
Vons: Private Label 1 -0.232* -14.030 -0.128* -2.987 -0.235* -11.520
Vons: Private Label 2 -0.159* -9.695 -0.008 -0.165 -0.068* -4.015
Vons: Private Label 3 -0.286* -24.580 -0.173* -5.021 -0.277* -15.804
SaveMart: Private Label 1 -0.369* -32.350 -0.201* -5.917 -0.274* -18.103
SaveMart: Private Label 2 0.009* 0.784 0.154* 4.970 0.126* 10.264
SaveMart: Private Label 3 0.718* 48.390 0.865* 25.395 1.050* 47.641
Any Private Label -0.088* -8.356 0.047 1.909 0.071* 6.658
Discount 0.055* 5.163 0.104* 8.079 0.069* 6.278
Discount*Price -0.485* -4.362 -0.765* -5.927 -0.987* -8.262
Store-Distance N.A. N.A. -0.900 -1.200 -0.083 -0.339
Brand-Distance N.A. N.A. 0.059 0.677 1.412* 4.154
Flavor-Distance N.A. N.A. -0.013 -0.182 0.593* 3.890
Nutrient-Distance N.A. N.A. -3.312* -5.340 -4.528* -22.008
Own-Price -1.259* -15.630 -1.482* -5.481 -6.472* -11.578
Own-Calories N.A. N.A. 0.022* 3.921 0.041* 15.354
Own-Fat N.A. N.A. -0.185* -3.609 -0.346* -13.11743
Own-Protein N.A. N.A. 0.203* 3.516 0.326* 7.141
Own-Carbos N.A. N.A. -0.122* -4.667 -0.212* -14.717
I ó 0.782* 722.600 0.778* 338.660 0.730* 148.670
J ó 0.445* 284.000 0.660* 17.802 0.623* 24.188
R  (psuedo-R  for GMM) 0.993 0.996 0.994
22
GMM Function Value 3825.148
QLR 102.489
    In this table, a single asterisk indicates significance at a 5% level. The variables are defined as follows: Discount
a
is a deal indicator value that assumes a value of 1.0 if the shelf price falls more than 10% in a given week and then
rises back to its previous level (or greater) the following week, Discount*Price is an interaction term with shelf
price, Store, Brand, Flavor and Nutrient-Distance are inverse Euclidean distances in discrete store, brand and flavor
I indicators and a continuous measure of total nutrient attribute inverse distance, ó  is the nested logit scaling
J parameter and a measure of heterogeneity among ice cream products, ó  is an equivalent measure among stores,
Own-Price is a constant price-response parameter, and Own-Calories, Own-Fat, Own-Protein, and Own-Carbos 
show how price response varies with own-product attributes.  QLR is a chi-square distributed quasi-likelihood ratio
statistic with 38 degrees of freedom (critical value at 5% = 53.10) that compares the estimated GMM objective
function to one calculated under a null-parameter assumption.   44
Table 3. GMM Estimates of Price Elasticity Matrix: First 18 Brand / Flavors, Albertsons
Elasticity of Row with respect to Column Brand / Flavor:  
a
11 12 13 14 15 21 22 23 24 25 31 32 33 34 35 41 42 43 b ,  f   b ,  f   b ,  f   b ,  f   b ,  f   b ,  f   b ,  f   b ,  f   b ,  f   b ,  f   b ,  f   b ,  f   b ,  f   b ,  f   b ,  f   b ,  f   b ,  f   b ,  f  
11 b ,  f   -5.085 0.059 0.062 0.050 0.062 0.055 0.051 0.052 0.061 0.061 0.052 0.050 0.045 0.045 0.049 0.045 0.048 0.046
12 b ,  f   0.083 -5.431 0.071 0.062 0.080 0.066 0.063 0.064 0.071 0.071 0.064 0.061 0.057 0.056 0.061 0.057 0.059 0.058
13 b ,  f   0.121 0.109 -3.858 0.106 0.127 0.128 0.114 0.120 0.227 0.234 0.120 0.109 0.101 0.100 0.107 0.101 0.104 0.102
14 b ,  f   0.077 0.071 0.078 -5.559 0.074 0.086 0.083 0.079 0.077 0.077 0.081 0.093 0.070 0.068 0.108 0.071 0.089 0.073
15 b ,  f   0.067 0.062 0.072 0.052 -5.574 0.059 0.055 0.057 0.074 0.074 0.057 0.053 0.049 0.049 0.052 0.049 0.051 0.049
21 b ,  f   0.049 0.046 0.057 0.048 0.049 -5.202 0.058 0.060 0.055 0.055 0.066 0.051 0.044 0.043 0.049 0.044 0.046 0.044
22 b ,  f   0.048 0.046 0.052 0.050 0.048 0.063 -5.191 0.074 0.052 0.052 0.083 0.062 0.046 0.044 0.053 0.046 0.050 0.047
23 b ,  f   0.085 0.081 0.095 0.084 0.086 0.110 0.121 -5.100 0.095 0.095 0.200 0.092 0.079 0.078 0.087 0.079 0.084 0.081
24 b ,  f   0.089 0.083 0.143 0.082 0.094 0.090 0.085 0.088 -5.071 0.445 0.088 0.083 0.079 0.079 0.082 0.079 0.081 0.079
25 b ,  f   0.059 0.056 0.098 0.055 0.063 0.061 0.057 0.059 0.299 -5.290 0.059 0.055 0.053 0.053 0.055 0.053 0.054 0.053
31 b ,  f   0.031 0.030 0.035 0.031 0.031 0.043 0.047 0.068 0.034 0.034 -12.967 0.034 0.029 0.029 0.032 0.029 0.031 0.030
32 b ,  f   0.021 0.020 0.022 0.024 0.021 0.025 0.029 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.025 -13.284 0.020 0.019 0.034 0.020 0.026 0.021
33 b ,  f   0.017 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.020 -10.145 0.027 0.019 0.062 0.021 0.033
34 b ,  f   0.020 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.038 -10.734 0.022 0.037 0.023 0.029
35 b ,  f   0.026 0.024 0.026 0.035 0.025 0.029 0.030 0.028 0.026 0.026 0.029 0.043 0.025 0.024 -13.127 0.025 0.038 0.027
41 b ,  f   0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.036 0.015 0.011 -9.556 0.012 0.020
42 b ,  f   0.015 0.014 0.015 0.019 0.014 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.022 0.016 0.015 0.026 0.016 -10.944 0.018
43 b ,  f   0.013 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.024 0.016 0.015 0.025 0.017 -10.851
  Elasticities represent the price elasticity of the row item with respect to a change in the price of the column item.  This table represents half of the elasticity
a
estimates for a single chain.  All other elasticities are similar and are available from the authors upon request. 4546
Table 4. GMM Estimates of Retail Ice Cream Supply: Retail and Mfg. Margins
Retailer Pricing Model Retailer / Mfg. Pricing Model
Variable Parameter Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
a
0 Constant è N.A. N.A. -0.022* -2.144
1 Private Label è N.A. N.A. 4.469* 3.770
2 Store è N.A. N.A. -0.769* -4.541
3 Brand è N.A. N.A. 0.771* 4.554
4 Flavor è N.A. N.A. 0.002 0.270
5 Attributes è N.A. N.A. 0.013 0.885
0 Constant ö -5.272* -8.130 -5.791* -10.277
1 Private Label ö 0.833 0.834 -1.188* -2.975
2 Store ö 3.184* 6.473 3.687* 7.461
3 Brand ö 0.078 0.228 -0.208 -1.305
4 Flavor ö 0.234 0.821 0.081 0.457
5 Attributes ö 2.493* 4.603 1.800* 6.768
0 Constant ã 0.006 1.600 0.004 1.187
1 Milk Price ã 0.013* 5.586 0.009* 4.275
2 Diesel Price ã -0.001 -1.327 -0.001 -1.072
3 HFCS Price ã 0.001* -4.399 0.001* -5.802
4 Dairy Wages ã 0.003* 7.614 0.002* 5.111
5 Ice Cream PPI ã -0.003* -7.229 -0.002* -5.113
6 Chocolate PPI ã 0.279* 2.286 0.297* 2.520
0.309* 7.887 0.474* 5.807
N.A. N.A. 0.508* 4.951
0.114* 348.408 0.111* 346.704
GMM Function 2441.447 2413.267
QLR 28.180
    In this table, store indicator variables have been omitted for brevity.  The entire set of parameter estimates are
a
available from the authors.  A single asterisk indicates significance at a 5% level.  The parameters are defined as
01 2 follows:  ö  is the mean “conduct parameter” downstream, or among retailers, ö  is the private label effect, ö  is the
34 5 brand effect, ö  is the flavor effect, ö  is the store effect, and ö  is the own-attribute effect.  The è parameters are
i defined similarly with respect to upstream conduct, or pricing relationships with ice cream manufacturers.  The ã
are parameters of the cost function.   is the fitted cost value,   is the fitted value of the retail margin conduct
parameter, and   is the fitted value of the manufacturing margin conduct parameter.  Brand and store cost function
effects are not presented due to space limitations, but are available from the authors.  The QLR test statistic is chi-
square distributed with 6 degrees of freedom (critical value = 12.59). 
 